Josephine O. Garrand v. Leonard J. Garrand : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Josephine O. Garrand v. Leonard J. Garrand : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Garrand v. Garrand, No. 16622 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1903
JOSEPHINE O. GARRAND, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH . 
for herself and as 
vs. 
LEONARD J. 
RICHARD L. BIRD 
333 East 400 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF RELIEF .............................................. 2 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS ........•...........•.................. , 2 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF 
RES JUDICATA ................................... . 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT LEONARD GARRAND 
·SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CHILD SUPPORT 
FOR JOSEPH PHILLIP GARRAND BEYOND THE AGE OF 
21 IS INEQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE VACATED CON-
SIDERING ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ....... . 
INDEX OF CASES 
Searle Bros. et al v. Edlean Searle 
6 December 1978, Supreme Court Case No. 15604 
Dehm v. Dehm, Utah ~~~~-'545 
Pacific -~2-n~d~5~2~5~(~1~9""'7,...,6,..,.)-............................... . 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
3 
3 
5 
4 
5 
Section 78-45-3 and 4 UCA 1953 ............................ 1 
Section 15-2-1 UCA 1953 ...........•................ · · · •. · · 3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF RELIEF 
Appellant, requests this court to rule that the trial 
court erred in requiring Leonard J. Garrand to continue paying 
support for Joseph Phillip Garrand. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Leonard J. and Josephine Garrand were divorced in 1969. 
Mr. Garrand, pursuant to stipulation was ordered to pay alimony 
to Josephine in the sum of $250.00 per month and was ordered 
to pay support for Carla Garrand and Joseph Phillip Garrand in 
the sum of $150.00 per month per child. At that time, an 
acknowledged fact taken into consideration by the court was that 
Joseph Phillip Garrand was a retarded person. (See paragraph 3, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, dated 10 October 1969). In 
1976 Josephine filed a petition to increase the alimony and 
support. The trial court, acting through Judge Jay Banks, in-
creased the support for Joseph Phillip Garrand to a sum of $250 .00 
per month, effective 15 April 1977. The court terminated support 
money for Carla Garrand as of March 1977 for the reason that Carla 
reached her 18th birthday at that time. The alimony was in-
creased from $250.00 per month to $375.00 per month, conunencing 
15 April 1977. The modification order was appealed and the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the District Court was not bound to 
terminate the daughter's support payments on her 18th birthday, 
but could continue them until she reached 21. The case was rernande: 
on that point. The result of the decision in the Supreme Court 
and the remand order was that the trial court was to take evidence 
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on the question as to whether or not extraordinary circumstances 
existed which would justify an order of child support for Carla 
between her 18th and 21st birthday. This point has not been 
pursued and Carla has now passed her 21st birthday. 
Josephine Garrand then (in October of 1978) brought a 
separate action as Guardian ad Litem for Joseph Phillip Garrand 
which had as its objective support past majority. It is from the 
ruling of Judge Leary which awarded Josephine Garrand $150.00 per 
month support that Leonard Garrand appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION .To· 
DISMISS BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The case of Garrand vs. Garrand, District Court Civil 
No. 186725 litigated the issue of support for Joseph Phillip 
Garrand and disposed of that issue when it modified Leonard 
Garrand's obligation with regards to the payment of child ·support. 
(See Paragraph _3, Order Modifying Decree, 19 April 1977). What 
Josephine Garrand is attempting to do in this action is to 
fasten Leonard Garrand with an obligation for support, which Judge 
Banks refused to do in his order of 19 April 1977, after the 
question of support for Joseph Phillip Garrand had been litigated. 
See Paragraph 4, Conclusions of Law, dated 19 April 1977, signed 
by Judge Banks, which states as follows: 
"Under the original decree in this action, the obligation 
for support continued as to the son Jo-,;eph until he reached 
age 21, which matter continues to be justici~le under the 
amendment to Section 15-2-1, UCA, 1953 by this court and 
because of special circumstances as to Joseph, the support 
should conti~ue to ag~ 21." 
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See also Paragraph 3 of Order Modifying Decree, 19 April, 
.1977, which increased the support for Josep11 Phillip to $2.5!J.OO 
per month. 
The court's attention is also invited to Paragraph 5 of 
Josephine's Petition for Modification, dated October, 1976, which 
states as follows: 
v. "Plaintiff has never threatened to discontinue support 
for the son, Joseph, and the silence of the decree as to 
the period of this support should be clarified and should 
continue as long as such help is needed." 
Leonard Garrand's response to this allegation and to the 
allegation that Carla should recieve support past majority are 
contained in Leonard Garrand's Counter Petition, Paragra?h 5, 
wherein Leonard Garrand denies Josephine's claim for support for 
Joseph Phillip past majority. These allegations .are alluded to . I 
indicate to this court the fact that the issue asserted by Josenhine; 
in this action were, in fact, thoroughly litigated in her Petition 
for Modification in 1976. If Josephine objected to Judge Banks' 
order regarding ongoing support for Joseph Phillips, she should 
have appealed this issue. Instead s~e appealed another issue and 
then brought a new law suit. 
The recent case of Searle Bros. et al vs Edlean Searle, 6 
December 1978, Supreme Court Case No. 15604 discusses the appli-
cation of the doctrine of res judicata to divorce cases. Justice 
Ellett, speaking for the court, states the rule which is applicable, 
to facts of this case: 
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judgments, is 
conclusive as to the oarties and their orivies and o~erates 
as a bar to any subsequent action. In order for judicata to 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their 
privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes 
the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated 
as well as those that were in fact litigated in the orior 
action." 
The court then states the rule as to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel as follows: 
"Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from a 
"different cause of action" and prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second 
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit." 
Thus, even if the subsequent lawsuit brought by Josephine 
Garrand to compel support from Leonard Garrand is characterized 
as a different cause of action, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is applicable to bar her claim due to the fact that the 
facts and issues in the subsequent suit were fully litigated in 
the 1976 Petition for Modification. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT LEONARD GARRAND SHOULD BE 
REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CHILD SUPPORT FOR JOSEPH PHILLIP 
GARRAND BEYOND THE AGE OF 21 IS INEQUITABLE AND SHOULD 
BE VACATED CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Dehm vs. Dehm 545 P2d·525 (1976) established authority of 
the court to make an order of support beyond age 21, but it doesn't 
make such an order manditory. The judge is empowered to consider 
the wife's increased alimony, her employability and all other 
relevant circumstances in determining the husband's obligation. 
The evidence adduced at the original hearing for Modification 
1976 - 1977 and at the subsequent hearing in 1979, indicated that 
Josephine Garrand is a woman with a profession possessing the 
qualifications to be employed as a registered nurse. The evidence 
further indicated that Josephine Garrand is a woman who has 
substantial means, i.e. $7,000.00 in a checking account and 
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a home located on the east bench in Salt Lake City, <.vhich i.;; 
free and clear of any incumbrances. ~otwi t!1standing these resources 
Mrs. Garrand has refused to work, by her own admission, because 
she "just doesn't want to". Mrs. Garrand, notwithstanding these 
facts, recieves $375.00 per month by way of alimony pursuant to 
Judge Banks' order in April of 1977. Leonard Garrand has faithfully 
paid his child support and alimony obligations plus attorney's 
fees since the original divorce decree in 1969. It is extremely 
unjust and inequitable to require to pay ongoing support and 
$375.00 per month alimony under these facts. 
For the reasons submitted above, Leonard J. Garrand, Appellant, 
through counsel, Stephen L. Johnston, esq. requests the court render 
an order which has the effect of vacating the order requiring 
Leonard J. Garrand to continue child support payments for Joseph 
Phillip Garrand beyond the age of 21 years. 
DATED this 'dC{i:b day of October, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steph 
P.O. Bo 1025 
431 South 300 Eas , Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Attorney for Appellant 
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